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Abstract
The increasing global attention to greenhouse emissions and the recent creation of EU
Emission Trading Scheme has clearly suggested the need of consistent methods to value
projects aimed to reduce gases. This need particularly concerns companies that have to
nd a way to both remain protable and conform to new legal requirements. Multiple ways
of cutting emission costs are available nowadays: short term abatement measures, which
primary involve switching production machinery from coal to gas; long term abatement
measures, which envisage the implementation of new types of projects e.g Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism or Joint Implementation Mechanism suggested by Kyoto Protocol -. In
this work we study the impact of the introduction of both kinds of policy in a pricing model
for CO2 allowances.
Keywords: CO2 emission certicates, EU-ETS system, CDM projects, Stochastic optimal
control.
1 Introduction
The Kyoto protocol, signed in December 1997 in the homonymous Japanese city, established
the basis for the global ght against carbon emissions. Not all countries in the world have
signed it  e.g. Afghanistan or Taiwan -, and some of the countries that subscribed the
protocol havent ratied it yet1 from now on Non-Annex I countries2 in opposition to
those nations that have both signed and ratied it  from now on Annex I countries -.
The original mechanisms introduced were mainly three:3
 International Emission Trading (IET): it permits the trade of CO2 allowances
credits Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) between Annex I countries;
 Joint Implementation (JI): it consists in projects implemented by an Annex I coun-
try into another Annex I country. Those projects give origins to carbon credit called Emission
Reduction Units (ERUs) for the implementing country, while create carbon debits of AAUs
that have to be deducted from the host country quota;
 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): it involves the enforcement of projects by
Annex I countries into Non-Annex I countries. The plan under analysis allows the Annex
I country to achieve carbon credits called Certied Emission Reduction Units (CERs) that
will be added to its own endowment of carbon certicates.
The European Union has been one of the rst to create a trading scheme system, the Eu-
ropean Union Emission Trading System - EU ETS -, which is nowadays the most developed
in the eld.
Meanwhile lots of studies have been focused on the ways of optimizing this relatively new
system. Environmental nance is a branch of nance that has an important role in this sort
of works. Within it, an even more innovative research front is the so-called carbon nance,
whose main goal is to understand price dynamics of carbon permits. Two types of factors
that could inuence the evolution of CO2 prices are currently under investigation:4 short-
term abatement measures and long-term abatement measures. The main di¤erence between
the two is the time the measure needs to become e¤ective and reduce GHG emissions. Short-
1See Borloo et al. (2008).
2The term Annex I countries is interchangeable with Annex B countries since it includes countries
listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. Annex Iis used just for simplicity but refers exactly to the same
nations.
3See Carmona, Fehr and Hinz (2009).
4See Carmona, Fehr and Hinz (2009).
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term measures are typically the ones whose results occur rapidly, already starting from the
rst compliance period the period at the end of which a company is required to comply
with the cap and trade5 system depending on CO2 emitted throughout the period -. They
are mainly represented by fuel switching processes e.g. switching machinery from coal to
gas or production re-schedule. Long-term measures, on the contrary, become e¤ectively
carbon protable only some years after their inception: they require high initial investments
which can be considered xed costs that will be recovered over the time of workability of
the plan through the carbon returns collected during all the projects horizon. JI and CDM
belong in all the e¤ects to this category. They depend critically on the availability of a long
term horizon in order to amortize their initial consistent cost. It has been observed6 that
the number of these projects sharply fell in the nal part of Phase II: they have become less
relevant in this pre-2013 period since their validity was conditioned to the fact that, even
if registered before 2013, they would have started to generate carbon emission reduction
from 2013 onwards.7 However their number started to grow again in these rst months of
Phase III, and it is forecasted to reach maximum peaks in the actual Phase due to its major
length.8
In this work project a two-scenarios nite horizon, continuous-time model is built in
order to reproduce the EU-ETS taking in consideration the environment with and without
the presence of CDM, in both models short term abatement measures are present. We focus
only on CDM since they are the most interesting instruments to lower carbon reduction. JIs
are only mechanisms to reallocate credits within countries that ratied the Protocol and,
actually, do not generate new carbon allowances. Possible extensions of the research could
try to insert this additional abatement measure in the model and study a more complete
and realistic scenario. At the end a numerical simulation is implemented in order to verify
the e¤ects of the presence of CDM projects on carbon price.
5The overall volume of GHG that can be emitted each year by the power plants, factories and other
companies covered by the system is subject to a cap set at EU level. Within this Europe-wide cap, companies
receive or buy emission allowances which they can trade if they wish, The EU-Emission Trading System
(EU ETS) European Commission Factsheet, 2013.
6See Kossoy and Guigon (2012).
7See Directive 2009/29/EC.
8Phase III will be 8 years long, the longest Phase since the creation of the EU-ETS.
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2 Literature Review
An initial input for the body of literature today known as environmental nance has been
given by Coase (1960) and Dales (1968). These authors were the rst to propose the idea
of tradable allowances as a way of endogenizing the social cost of pollution and make more
e¤ective the resolution of this increasingly analyzed environmental problem. After these
publications a wide number of studies headed toward the search for the equilibrium price of
emission allowances. The topic was particularly deepened by Cronshaw and Kruse (1996)
and Rubin (1996) who demonstrated the equality between such price at equilibrium and
the marginal cost of the cheapest available abatement strategy for pollution. These results
apply only to situations without uncertainty, so their real implementation is quite di¢ cult
and they remain conned as more theoretical ndings. Nonetheless they represent the basis
for the future developments in the eld. Carmona, Fehr and Hinz (2009) analyzed in a
more realistic way the environmental problem, contextualizing the opportunity of reducing
carbon emission in the newborn EU Emission Trading Scheme. They were the rst to make
a distinction between short-term and long-term abatement measures, available to rms after
the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol to reduce carbon emissions. The paper suggests
a model for pricing CO2 permits in case N rms decide to apply fuel switching, the cheapest
short-term abatement process available. The analysis under consideration relates only to
one trading period in the case of EU ETS it is the year - that, even if divided in subperiods
to account for within-period trading among rms, does not permit to consider multiperiod
abatement strategies such as JI or CDM, explicitly introduced by Kyoto Protocol. Evaluat-
ing only short-term measures is not representative of the real future possibilities available to
rms since, even if in the present they are the cheapest procedures, in the near future they
could be considered obsolete: when a rm already switches its technologies it becomes harder
to nd new protable opportunities to switch them again. Seifert et al. (2008) consider one
representative agent/rm that can decide how to comply with the pollution restrictions ei-
ther paying a penalty or reducing its emissions. The paper develops an interesting model
that permits to analyze the spot price of CO2 allowances at the beginning of the compliance
period. Starting from this equilibrium price a sensitivity analysis is conducted in order to
understand which variables impact on this price. Like the previous paper also this one lacks
a multiperiod view and is limited to short-term measures implemented in a compliance inter-
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val. Chesney and Taschini (2012) re-elaborate the preceding works introducing asymmetric
information between participants in the carbon market. The main nding is that the carbon
price reects the probability of not complying with the regulation at the end of the period.
They introduce the problem of long-term abatement projects but only as a matter whose
value can be inuenced by the carbon price path. Actually they want to predict future
carbon spot prices in order to understand what could be the actual value of these projects,
while in this paper we want to understand which impact the availability of these schemes
can have on the decision to implement them from the rmsand regulators point of view.
We have identied a gap in the literature history mainly concerning the non-inclusion of
long term projects in decisions taken by rms relating to their emission schemes. Since we
support the idea that those projects are an essential part of a companys decision making
process, we want to include them in the analysis and see if their introduction is worth or
not. Their presence should be protable simultaneously9 for the rms and the Policy Maker:
a company in order to implement them should be better o¤, in terms of wealth, with their
inclusion, while the Policy Maker should observe a diminution in the overall level of CO2
emitted in the environment. In order to control for those two e¤ects we used dynamic
programming instruments respectively for evaluating the rmswealth, function of both the
emission policy of every company and the rules imposed by the EU-ETS,10 and the aggregate
level of emissions in the air, function of the emission policies only. At the end of this paper
we elaborate a numerical simulation showing under which conditions the presence of long
term projects is justied. In these cases CDM should be considered a basic instrument for
the Policy Maker to inuence carbon price preventing the Scheme to reach extreme peaks.
3 The Model
3.1 The main assumptions
Following the assumptions made by Seifert et al (2008) the model does not refer to the
wealth-maximization of a single rm, but rather to a social wealth-maximization problem in
which all rms that take part in the economic process are considered.11 The social planner
9If only one part considers the project necessary it will not apport any positive e¤ects in the world we
are considering.
10In particular we will show that some EU-ETSs rules will impact directly on the level of emissions chosen
by rms.
11For a discussion of the equivalence between this two maximization problems refer to Appendix B.
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is called to make a social-optimum choice, considering the aggregate level of emission and
the aggregate costs linked with emission cut. All the parameters presented thereafter should
be intended as aggregate ones.
As already discussed in the introduction, the framework in which the model is inserted
is a nite horizon one, with T representing the nal period under analysis. We assumed
T to be the duration of a EU-ETS Phase, presently it is equal to 8 years. Since in the
European scheme a compliance period is one year long12 we impose a penalty condition for
every integer intermediate instant:
P
 
xAt

=Min

0; pt(et 1   xAt )

, t = 1; 2; 3::; T (1)
where xA is the total accounted emissions for the rms in the Scheme - it will be dened later
in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 -, et is the initial endowment of EUAs13 allocated at the beginning
of every compliance period to the companies by the regulator - for t = 0; 1; 2; ::; T   1 - and
pt is the penalty charged for every additional emission unit.
In the absence of abatement policies the rms emit at a rate yt at every instant for the
entire duration of the period; yt is not under the control of the planner, and it can be split
in two parts: a deterministic component (t; yt), and a volatility of (t; yt).
The emission process yt follows the subsequent stochastic process, with y0 equal to a
given constant:
dyt = (t; yt)dt+ (t; yt)dWt (2)
where dWt represents the instantaneous increment of a standard Wiener process.14 It appears
reasonable to have an exogenous emission rate since in reality it can be a¤ected by unexpected
factors: changes in prices or structural changes in the sector.
In the models there are mainly three ways of reducing carbon emissions in every instant
t:
12At the end of every year the rms have to comply with the restrictions of the Scheme, and in case their
emissions overpass their permits they have to pay a penalty.
13EUAs stay for European Union Allowances that is the European equivalent of AAUs.
14A standard Wiener process, also called standard Brownian motion, is a continuous time stochastic
process; on the interval [0; T ] it satises the following conditions: W (0) = 0 and for 0  s < t  T
W (s)  W (t) 
p
t  s  N (0; 1) where N (:) is the normal distribution with mean  = 0 and variance
2 = 1; so the Wiener process has stationary and independent increments.
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type of abatement strategy cost of the strategy payout of the strategy
buy CO2 permits on the market S(t) n
short term abatement strategies t f
CDM projects C
t+1
t
(Table 1.)
The carbon price in every instant is S(t), n is the quantity of CO2 embedded in every
permit; t is the price of implementing a short term abatement measure at every t it is
considered exogenous, f is the quantity of CO2 abated by the short term strategy in every
instant; C
t+1
is the xed cost of implementing a CDM project - it is decreasing in time meaning
that a full initial amount C is paid only at t = 0 while thereafter only lower amounts are
paid to maintain the project operative - , while t is the carbon return of the project in
every t it is also taken as exogenous, it depends on two factors: g, the quantity of CO2
e¤ectively saved by the project in every moment and ; the conversion rate adopted by the
regulator to convert carbon saved in carbon reduction within the scheme. In particular t
can be modelled as:
t = tg: (3)
For example if  = 1 every unit of carbon saved by the project can be translated in a complete
unit of carbon saved in the scheme, if  < 1 the scheme accepts as carbon reduction a lower
quantity than the one e¤ectively cut, and if  > 1 the scheme accepts as carbon reduction a
higher quantity than the one e¤ectively saved in the CDM. This  is an interesting variable
to study since it can be chosen by the policy maker and directly a¤ects the carbon price
through the carbon return of the projects under consideration.
In order to simplify the problem we assume homogeneity in the economy: every rm
implements in period 0 the same project with the same cost and the same carbon returns.
So if N rms are considered in the economy the cost of a single CDM will result in C
N
while
the return in every instant of a single project will be t
N
:
As previously explained trade of permits is explicitly considered as a way of reducing
carbon emissions. Nevertheless, since we are considering an aggregate problem, it does
not impact on the solution. In fact if zi;t represents the number of permits exchanged -
positive if bought, negative if sold - by rm i at time t, we have to assume the market
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clearing condition
PN
i=1 z

i;t = 0, and the exchange of permits does not impact anymore on
the aggregate objective function of our problem.15 This condition implies the assumption
that permits are exchanged only between rms that take part to the Scheme; in reality we all
know that the trading is open also to other institutions as well as to individual investors. So,
using the above mentioned description, would give only a partial and incomplete description
of the real market. For now we limit our analysis to this more abstract case leaving this
problem to possible future expansion of the study.
At this point we have to mention some simplications that help us to solve explicitly
the maximization problem that will be introduced in Sections 3.2 and 3.3: in particular
 (t; yt) = 0 and  (t; yt) =  so the volatility is independent of time, in this case yt is
assumed to follow a translated Brownian motion; in addition the time discount factor r = 0,
there is no time preference in the model; nally we assume t =  constant along the duration
T of the Phase.16 These conditions, even if reductive in terms of reality, help us to solve the
model and understand the basic properties of the solutions.
3.2 Model 1 - without CDM
3.2.1 General Setup
Now that all the assumptions have been stated we can go deeply in the specications of the
two models. We start with the one in which CDM are not considered.
The total expected emission in the environment at period t is xt: it has an uncontrolled
component yt;17 and a component that can be inuenced directly by behaviors of the com-
panies that take part in the scheme, ut:
xt = yt  
Z t
0
usds : (4)
The expected emissions coincide with the actual ones because we assume the past to be the
best prediction of the future:
Et(yT ) = yt: (5)
15See Appendix B for the complete derivation.
16The stability of -policy will rely, in reality, on the actual duration of the phase: for small T it is
reasonable to assume constant , while for big T the Policy Maker could nd more favourable to change 
along time in order to better inuence the carbon price.
17What impact on xt is the expected value in instant t of the total emission over the period [0; T ]: yt:
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Following directly from the aforementioned denition the nal and initial expectations
read respectively:
xT = yT  
Z T
0
usds ; (6)
x0 = y0: (7)
An innitesimal increment in xt will be:
dxt =  utdt+ dWt: (8)
At this point it is useful to introduce a focal distinction between actual emissions reected
in Equation (4) and the emissions related to the account of the rms. The latter ones come
directly from the rules of the Scheme that allow rms, with permits in excess, to keep those
permits as credits for the next period, whereas rms with a lack of permits only have to pay
the penalty but are not a¤ected by the permitsaccount of next period. What we mean is
that if in the rst compliance period the rm pollutes less than the number of permits it
has been provided with, e0 > x1, it will be able to transfer the excess of permits (e0   x1)
to the second compliance period, while in the case e0 < x1 it will have to pay a penalty of
p1 (x1   e0) ; but no debt will be registered in her second period permitsaccount which will
be cleared at the moment of the payment. We will call the account value of emission xA to
distinguish it from the actual value of total emissions x; all the choices, that the rms will
take, will depend on xA, while the policy maker will be interested mainly in x as an indicator
of the overall pollution present in the environment. Notice that an innitesimal increment
in xA will be the same of x - as expressed in Equation (8) -, except at integer t. Due to
this "jump" at the end of every compliance periods in the account side of emissions, we will
have a discontinuity between the nal and initial value of emissions registered by rms, in
particular the nal value of accounted emissions for the rst period will be:18
xA1 = y1   y0  
Z 1
0
usds = x1   x0; (9)
while the initial value of emissions accounted by rms for the second period - to distinguish
it from the previous one we indicate it with a +- will be:
xA1+ =  max

0; e0   xA1

: (10)
18Notice that only for the rst period we have a coincidence between xA1 and x1:
8
If we want to generalize this condition we have to better dene it compliance period
by compliance period; in particular considering a compliance period that starts in m and
nishes in n;19 we have the nal condition:20
xAn = xn   xm  
mX
i=1
max [0; ei 1   (xi   xi 1)] ; (11)
and the initial condition of the next compliance period:21
xAn+ =  
nX
i=1
max [0; ei 1   (xi   xi 1)] : (12)
This condition will apply also to all the subsequent intermediate xAt in the next compliance
period [n; o], with t 2 (n; o):
xAt = xt   xn  
nX
i=1
max [0; ei 1   (xi   xi 1)] . (13)
Equation (4) is qualitatively di¤erent from both Equations (11) and (12) since it expresses
the actual emissions in the environment and it is not inuenced by rmscarbon credits.
The nal compliance conditions P () will be all expressed in terms of xAn if referred to the
nal period n:
The aggregate cost function, increasing in time, is assumed to satisfy the quadratic
relation between cost and chosen abatement rate:
C (t; ut) =  
1
2t
u2t : (14)
Every rm in reality will choose rst to use the cheapest available measures and only after
to use the more expensive ones. Consequently we will observe an increasing sequence of
t where 1 < 2 < ::: < T so that the marginal abatement cost 1t will be decreasing in
time. Also in this case it is assumed that all rms have access in every period to the same
abatement technology. As already stated by Seifert et Al (2008) the simplication that all
rms face an equal marginal abatement cost could be a very restrictive assumption since
if all rms could use the same technology to abate a carbon trading scheme would become
meaningless; in fact the scheme can be considered a valuable option for rms to nd on the
19Remember that a compliance period in the EU ETS is 1 year long, therefore in order to contestualize
our model in reality we should have m  n = 1:
20In the following three equations, the summation starts from 1 if the rm never paid a penalty before
compliance period n; otherwise it should start in the period after the last penalty payment. To keep notation
lighter, we write as if the former is always the case. The modication to the general case is straightforward.
21Note that xAn+ is a function of x
A
i ; i = 1; ::; n:
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market cheapest ways to abate their carbon emissions levels, given that they face di¤erent
costs of short term abatement.
At this point, remembering the sequence of nal conditions for every compliance period
in Equation (1), the objective function can be formulated as:
max
(ut)t2[0;T ]
E0
"Z T
0
C (t; ut) dt+
TX
i=1
P
 
xAi
#
; (15)
with the nal conditions expressed as
P (xAi ) = min

0; pi(ei 1   xAi )

for i = 1; ::; T   1. (16)
This problem can be characterized as partial equilibrium since it refers solely to carbon
market, taking in consideration the "carbon" side of both costs and revenues: the cost
function refers to costs related to emission abatement measures while the "carbon" revenues
are considered for the state equation, in particular they contribute to decrease the overall
level of emissions in the system.
3.2.2 Solution for T=2
We conducted the analysis for T=2 for ease of exposition, but an identical procedure can be
applied to every T .
In this scenario the problem can be reformulated as follows:
max
(ut)t2[0;2]
E0
"Z 2
0
  1
2t
u2tdt+
2X
i=1
min

0; pi(ei 1   xA1 )
#
: (17)
We approached our analysis through a dynamic programming backward approach solving
rst the optimization problem over the period [1; 2],22 considering as nal condition:
P (xA2 ) = min

0; p2(e1   xA2 )

; (18)
and nding an explicit resolution for the rmsvalue function V (), at the beginning of the
considered interval: V1
 
1; xA1+

;23 we, then, rewrote our problem as:
max
(ut)t2[0;2]
E0
Z 1
0
  1
2t
u2tdt+min

0; p1(e0   xA1 )

+ V1(1; x
A
1+)

, (19)
22This second part coincides with the solution found by Seifert et al (2008).
23We evaluated V () at xA1+ and not at xA1 because rms base their decision not on actual emissions but
on accounted emissions, therefore taking in consideration eventual credits obtained in the precedent period.
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taking into consideration as nal condition:
P (xA1 ) = min

0; p1(e0   xA1 )

+ V1(1; x
A
1+) , (20)
we arrived at an implicit formulation of V0(0; xA0 ):
It is possible to generalize the problem, in particular the principle of optimality for
stochastic optimal control requires that:
V (t; xAt ) = max
ut
Et

C(t; ut)dt+ V (t+ dt; x
A
t + dx
A
t )

. (21)
This only holds on (0; 1)[ (1; 2)[ :::[ (T   1; T ), but not on t = 1; 2; :::T   1 where we have
the discontinuity analyzed before in relation with the rule imposed by EU ETS Scheme at
every crossing point between two compliance periods.
Since from Equations (2) and (8) the expected change in V () is:24
E(dV ) = V (t)dt  utV (x)dt+
1
2
2V (xx)dt ; (22)
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation results in:
0 = max
ut

  1
2t
u2t + V
(t)   utV (x) +
1
2
2V (xx)

: (23)
Using the FOC of this maximization problem we arrive to the optimal abatement rate:
ut = V
(x)t , (24)
and remembering that the equilibrium carbon price equals the marginal abatement cost:
S(t; xAt ) =
ut
t
=  V (x) . (25)
The optimal carbon prices for the two compliance periods respectively S1; S0;25 calling:
A(xAt ; t) =
e1   xAt + p21(2  t)

p
(2  t)
; (26)
B(xAt ; t) =
e1   xAt

p
(2  t)
, (27)
D
 
xAt ; t

=
p2(p21 + 2(e1   xAt ))
22
, (28)
24See Seifert et al (2008), pag 184.
25For the explicit derivation of these expressions see Appendix A.
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and:
erf (k) =
2p

Z k
0
e t
2
dt: (29)
are:
S1(t; x
A
t ) =
p2e
D(xAt ;t)[1  erf(A
 
xAt ; t

)]
1 + erf(B (xAt ; t)) + [e
D(xAt ;t)(1  erf(A (xAt ; t))]
; (30)
and, dening:
 
 
t; xAt

=
1
2
p
(1  t)
Z e0
 1
e
 (xAt  x
A
0 )
2
22(1 t) dxA0 ; (31)
+
 
t; xAt

=
1
2
p
(1  t)
Z +1
e0
e
 (xAt  x
A
0 )
2
22(1 t) e
p1(e0 x
A
0 )t
2 dxA0 ; (32)
 
 
t; xAt

=
1
2
p
(1  t)
Z e0
 1
e
 (xAt  x
A
0 )
2
22(1 t)
 2(xAt   xA0 )
22(1  t)
dxA0 ; (33)
+
 
t; xAt

=
1
2
p
(1  t)
Z +1
e0
e
 (xAt  x
A
0 )
2
22(1 t) e
p1(e0 x
A
0 )t
2
 2(xAt   xA0 )
22(1  t)
dxA0 ; (34)
together with:
F1 =
1
2
(1 + erf(B(xA0+; 0)) + e
D(xA0+;0)(1  erf(A
 
xA0+; 0

))): (35)
S0
 
t; xAt

=
2
t
 
 
 
t; xAt

F1 + +
 
t; xAt

F1
  (t; x
A
t )F1 + + (t; x
A
t )F1
!
: (36)
3.3 Model 2 - with CDM
3.3.1 General Setup
The structure of this second Model resembles the one of Model 1, the principal di¤erence
is that now every rm implements a CDM project in period 0; the aggregate initial cost of
these projects is C and they deliver an aggregate return of 26 in every instant t:
The total expected emissions xt is now inuenced also by the carbon returns of the
projects in every instant of the aforementioned subperiod, namely :
xt = yt  
Z t
0
(us + )ds: (37)
Following directly from the aforementioned denition only the nal expectation appears
changed:
xT = yT  
Z T
0
(us + )ds, (38)
26For the specication of  see Equation (3).
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while the initial one remains the same as Equation (7).
Therefore an innitesimal increment in xt will be:
dxt =  (ut + )dt+ dWt . (39)
Also in Model 2 we have a di¤erentiation between actual emissions - Equation (37) - and
accounted emissions that, generalized over a compliance period [m;n], now read at the end
of the period:27
xAn = xn   xm  
mX
i=1
max [0; ei 1   (xi   xi 1)] ; (40)
and at the beginning of the next compliance period:28
xAn+ =  
nX
i=1
max [0; ei 1   (xi   xi 1)] : (41)
This condition will apply also to all the subsequent intermediate xAt in the next compliance
period [n; o] ;with t 2 (n; o):
xAt = xt   xn  
nX
i=1
max [0; ei 1   (xi   xi 1)] : (42)
As in the previous model, the aggregate cost function is assumed increasing-in time, but
now it presents an additional component linked with the costs associated to CDM projects:
C (t; ut) =  
1
2t
u2t  
C
t+ 1
. (43)
The objective function can be formulated as in Model 1, following Equation (15). With
nal conditions expressed as in Equation (16).
We are again in front of a partial-equilibrium problem as it takes in consideration only
the carbon market.
3.3.2 Solution for T=2
The same methodology as before is applied and the analysis is conducted for T = 2 for ease
of exposition.29
27In the following three equations, the summation starts from 1 if the rm never paid a penalty before
compliance period n; otherwise it should start in the period after the last penalty payment. To keep notation
lighter, we write as if the former is always the case. The modication to the general case is straightforward.
28Note that xAn+ is a function of x
A
i , i = 1; ::; n:
29Remember that this procedure can be applied to every desired T.
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In this scenario the problem can be reformulated as follows:
max
(ut)t2[0;2]
E0
"Z 2
0

  1
2t
u2t  
C
t+ 1

dt+
2X
i=1
min

0; pi(ei 1   xAi )
#
: (44)
Since the xed cost C is not time dependent, we can subtract it from the expectation and
add it back only at the end when explicit solutions for V () are found. Therefore Equation
(44) can be rewritten as:
max
(ut)t2[0;2]
E0
"Z 2
0
  1
2t
u2tdt+
2X
i=1
min

0; pi(ei 1   xAi )
#
  C ln 3: (45)
Equation (21) applies also to Model 2, together with the already discussed discontinuity
of V (). On account of the resulting expected change in V () from Equations (38) and (39):
E(dV ) = V (t)dt  (ut + )V (x)dt+
1
2
2V (xx)dt , (46)
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation results in:
0 = max
ut

  1
2t
u2t + V
(t)   (ut + )V (x) +
1
2
2V (xx)

. (47)
Using the FOC of this maximization problem we arrive to the optimal abatement rate
in Equation (24) which coincides with the one found in Model 1; this is due to the fact that
the presence of CDM projects does not impact directly on the abatement rate that has to be
chosen by the rm, not modifying consequently the optimal rate. Furthermore, remembering
that the equilibrium carbon price equals the marginal abatement cost, we obtain S as in
Equation (25); once more this optimal level is not impacted directly by the presence of CDM
projects, since it ultimately relies on the optimal abatement rate.
We conduct our analysis through a dynamic programming backward approach following
exactly the same steps previously faced. The second part of Equation (44) coincides with
the problem stated by Seifert et al (2008), so we achieve an easy derivation of the solution
which coincides with solution (3.2) of the paper30 modied for the presence of  in the
expected emission function. Finding an explicit value for V1
 
1; xA1+

allows us to rewrite
the maximization problem (44) as in Equation (19) with a new nal condition expressed
in Equation (20). Solving this new maximization problem lead us to V0(0; xA0 ) which now
appears to be implicitly formulated.
30See Seifert et al (2008), pag. 185, Equation (3.2).
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The optimal carbon prices for the two compliance periods respectively S1; S0;31 and call-
ing:
ACDM(x
A
t ; t) =
e1   (xAt+ + t) +  + p21(2  t)

p
(2  t)
; (48)
BCDM(x
A
t ; t) =
e1   (xAt+ + t) + 

p
(2  t)
, (49)
DCDM
 
xAt ; t

=
p2(p21 + 2(e1   (xAt+ + t) + ))
22
. (50)
are now:
S1;CDM(t; x
A
t ) =
p2e
DCDM(xAt+;t)[1  erf(ACDM
 
xAt+; t

)]
1 + erf(BCDM (xAt+; t)) + e
DCDM(xAt+;t)[1  erf(ACDM (xAt+; t)]
; (51)
and, dening:
Ĉ = C ln
3
2
; (52)
 ;CDM
 
t; xAt

=
e Ĉ
1
2
2
p
(1  t)
Z e0
 1
e
 (xAt +t x
A
0 )
2
22(1 t) dxA0 ; (53)
+;CDM
 
t; xAt

=
e Ĉ
1
2
2
p
(1  t)
Z +1
e0
e
 (xAt +t x
A
0 )
2
22(1 t) e
p1(e0 x
A
0 )t
2 dxA0 ; (54)
 ;CDM
 
t; xAt

=
e Ĉ
1
2
2
p
(1  t)
Z e0
 1
e
 (xAt +t x
A
0 )
2
22(1 t)
 2(xAt + t  xA0 )
22(1  t)
dxA0 ; (55)
+;CDM
 
t; xAt

=
e Ĉ
1
2
2
p
(1  t)
Z +1
e0
e
 (xAt +t x
A
0 )
2
22(1 t) e
p1(e0 x
A
0 )t
2
 2(xAt + t  xA0 )
22(1  t)
dxA0 ;(56)
together with:
F1;CDM =
1
2
(1 + erf(BCDM(x
A
0+; 0)) + e
DCDM(xA0+;0)(1  erf(ACDM
 
xA0+; 0

))): (57)
S0;CDM
 
t; xAt

=
2
t
 
 ;CDM
 
t; xAt

F1;CDM + +;CDM
 
t; xAt

F1;CDM
 ;CDM (t; x
A
t )F1;CDM + +;CDM (t; x
A
t )F1
!
: (58)
4 Numerical validation
4.1 Simulation A
Now that we have the quantitative tools to analyze the problem, we want to put them in
practice with some numerical simulation attempts. As already stated in the introduction, it
31For the explicit derivation of all the following expressions see Appendix A.
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is our intention to verify numerically the relevance of the CDM presence. Choosing, like in
Seifert (2008),32 some numbers for the parameters included in the analysis, we were able to
compare Model 1 and Model 2 scenarios. In particular we imposed in both Models:
 y0 e0 e1 p1 p2
288 6240 150 100 70 130
(Table 2.)
and an increasing33 sequence of t :
t = 0:24 for t 2 [0; 1] ;
t = 0:35 for t 2

1;
1
2

;
t = 0:40 for t 2

1
2
; 2

:
while only for the case with CDM:
C 
25 2:5
(Table 3.)
with  = 1 and g = 2:5:
The results obtained are the following:34
Final Emissions x2 (Model 1- Model 2)
-5 0 5 10 15 20 25
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Variability Indicators
Average 6:89
St. Deviation 5:67
Min. Value  1:98
Max. Value 23:31
1st Quartile 3:21
Median Value 5:99
3rd Quartile 10:81
(Exhibit 1)
With a positive percentage change in V (x0; 0) from Model 1 to Model 2 of 3:15%:
As it can be noticed:
 
x2 (with CDM) <
 
x2 (without CDM) ;
32The analysis was mainly inspired by Seifert et. al (2008) Table 2, pag 186.
33This reects the assumption of increasing marginal costs for short-term abatement measures.
34These numbers are the results obtained with 50 realizations of the innite number of Brownian Motion
that we can simulate. The simulations are performed in Excel with the Brownian Motion discretized over
100 points - each period -, and integrals are computed numerically by the rectanglesmethod.
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meaning that Model 2 scenario will be preferred to the one of Model 1 by the Policy Maker
because of the lower level of emissions in the environment; and
V (x0; 0) (with CDM) > V (x0; 0) (without CDM) ;
meaning that the rms are better o¤ in Model 2, if compared to Model 1, because they
experience a higher level of wealth there. Therefore the two requirements - one imposed by
the Policy Maker and the other by the rms taking part to the Scheme - are simultaneously
satised, and CDM projects are always implemented under the aforementioned conditions.
4.2 Simulation B
Now a static setting - the same elaborated by Seifert and extended in a multiperiod scenario-
is taken into consideration, with non-changing number of permits and level of penalty:
 y0 e0 e1 p1 p2
288 6240 150 150 70 70
(Table 5.)
and a constant  = 0:24. Maintaining unaltered the condition for Model 2, we obtain:
Final Emissions x2 (Model 1 - Model 2)
-35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Variability Indicators
Average 4:58
St. Deviation 5:91
Min. Value  33:08
Max. Value 10:68
1st Quartile 3:91
Median Value 5:29
3rd Quartile 6:35
(Exhibit 2)
With a positive percentage change in V (x0; 0) from Model 1 to Model 2 of 3:20%:
As it can be expected, in the static case the introduction of CDM projects is still worth
for the Policy Maker and the rms because it ensures lower carbon emissions and higher
wealth level. Nevertheless, through a direct comparison with simulation A juxtaposing
absolute values instead of di¤erences and percentual changes, we realize that, while rms
prefer Simulation B case - the reason is straightforward: in this scenario the cost of short-
term abatement measures remains constant, together with penalty and number of permits
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immitted in the market, all throughout the Phase therefore the total cost paid by rms to
reduce carbon emissions is overall lower -, the Policy Maker favors Simulation A case where
absolute lower levels of emissions in the environment are reached.
To sum up the e¤ectiveness of CDM projectsintroduction is veried in all the Model
specications since it positively impacts both on the rmswealth and on the overall carbon
emissionslevel, but we mostly agree with the fact that, in order to maximize their social
value, they should be used in combination with a progressively increasing penalty system -
as the one in Simulation A, which mostly resembles the real world case - where short-term
abatement measurescost increases with time, the penalty becomes more stringent year by
year and the number of carbon permits immited on the market is similarly reduced. The
regulator should consider, at all the e¤ects, these projects an alternative way - additional
to the number of carbon permits emitted - of impacting on the carbon market and possibly
inuencing carbon prices uctuations.35
5 Conclusion and Remarks
The aim of this work has been to study the introduction of CDM projects in the European
carbon market through a theoretical model. Using dynamic programming tools, we were
able to derive the intertemporal choices of the social planner about emission processes of
rms included in the Scheme. We derived such an intertemporal analysis for both the cases
in which CDM were present or not. The dynamic problem was solved for a 2-period scenario
that allowed for a simpler manual resolution, but it can be extended to whichever Phases
length with the help of specic mathematical software.
We concluded that the presence of long term projects is justied and can be exploited, as
a policy-making instrument, at most in the cases where the regulation parameters reect a
punishment mechanism that penalizes more emissions at the end of the Phase than the ones
at the beginning. We strongly think that such a structure mirrors the one actually in use
in the EU-ETS, therefore we consider this conclusion valid and applicable to the European
reality.
Recently the European Trading Scheme has faced some challenges relating to the drop
of carbon price. In April 2013 this price reached a minimum peak of 3.05 euro, putting
35In Appendix C we will show carbon price reactions to changes in the di¤erent parameters under analysis.
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in danger the very survival of the overall System. In fact if the price would continue to
decrease, reaching the minimum admissible threshold of 0, there will be no more need of a
carbon market: every market is useless if the good traded does not have a price. It is now
clear that the Policy Maker should nd new and more e¤ective ways to inuence the carbon
price and take under control the markets tendencies.
Following the results of our study we recommend the Regulator to take in consideration
CDM projects as a way of directly inuencing the aforementioned variables. Our feeling is
that those projects have been disregarded in the previous Phases of the Scheme, a fact that
could be explained by the short duration of such Phases and the consequent complexity in
developing complete projects. However, due to the length of the actual Phase, we consider
the reappraisal of CDM projects, and macro-policies related to them, as a fundamental and
unavoidable choice for the Policy Maker. All throughout the paper we underlined diverse
factors that can be manipulated in order to achieve predened goals: the use of the conversion
rate between permits originated in a project and permits accepted in the market - the so
called -variable -; the cost of the CDM project; the recognized carbon returns of the project
- strictly related to the -policy -. Appraising these instruments could be a possible way of
escaping the actual unwanted situation, bringing the Scheme back to a healtier and more
e¤ective functioning.
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7 Appendix A - Extensive Solution of the Maximiza-
tion Problem in 2 Periods
Since Model 1 and 2 are very similar for what concerns the objective function to maximize
and the procedure used to solve the problem, we give the explicit resolution for Model 2
conscious that the same approach has been used for Model 1.
In Section 3 we already stated the initial problem in Equation (45);36 making use of
Dynamic Programming, we take the nal part considering only the problem:
max
(ut)t2[1;2]
E1
Z 2
1
  1
2t
u2tdt+min

0; p2(e1   xA2 )

: (59)
the nal condition is espressed at the nal period T = 2: Through the HJB Equation (47)
we are able to compute the optimal abatement rate (24), and adding it back to the HJB
Equation we arrive at the characteristic Partial Di¤erential Equation - from now on PDE -:
V (t) =  1
2
2V (xx)   1
2
tV
2(x) + V (x) , (60)
36We take as given the already discussed - in Section 4.1 - question of the removal of Ct+1 from the
maximization problem.
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which is very similar to the one found in Seifert et. al (2008) with the exception of a new
term in V (x) linked with :
Our goal is to reduce this PDE to a standard Heat Equation of the type:
f (t) = 'f (xx);
f
 
xA1 ; 1

= g
 
xA1

:
(61)
to be able to solve it through the standard solution expressed as:
f (x; t) =
1p
4't
Z +1
 1
e 
(x y)2
4't g(y)dy . (62)
In order to follow this structure we need to apply to Equation (60) three transormations.
Transformation 1:
V (xAt ; t) =
2
t
ln(v(xAt ; t)) , (63)
with the inverse:
v(xAt ; t) = e
t
2
V (xAt ;t) . (64)
Transformation 2:
v(xAt ; t) = u(zt; t) , (65)
where zt = xt + t; with the inverse:
u(zt; t) = v(zt   t; t) . (66)
Transformation 3:
u(zt; t) = ~u(z ; ) , (67)
where  = T   t; with the inverse:
~u(z ; ) = u(zt; T   ) . (68)
From Transformation (63) we obtain the following values for the derivatives of V with re-
spect to t and xt - using the fact that t is taken as exogenous - , respectively V (t); V (x); V (xx) :37
V (t) = 
2
t
v(t)
v
;
V (x) = 
2
t
v(x)
v
;
V (xx) = 
2
t
[v
(xx)
v
  (v(x)
v
)2]:
which plugged into PDE (60) gives:
v(t) =  1
2
2v(xx) + v(x) . (69)
37V (xx) represents the second derivative of V () with respect to xA:
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From Transformation (65) we obtain the following values for the derivatives of v with
respect to t and xt, respectively v(t); v(x); v(xx) :
v(t) = u(z) + u(t);
v(x) = u(z);
v(xx) = u(zz):
which plugged into PDE (69) gives:
u(t) =  1
2
2u(zz) , (70)
which is almost Equation (61).
In order to obtain exactly the Heat Equation we apply Transformation (67), from which
we obtain the following values for the derivatives of u with respect to t and zt, respectively
u(t); u(x); u(xx) :
u(t) =  ~u();
u(x) = ~u(z);
u(xx) = ~u(zz):
which plugged into PDE (70) gives:
~u() =
1
2
2~u(zz) , (71)
which is exactly Equation (61), with ' = 1
2
2:
Since, in order to solve the Heat Equation we need an initial condition, we use our
bundary condition (18). To be consistent we apply to this condition all the transformations
applied to the PDE. After Transformation (63) it reads:
P (xA2 ; 2) = e
min[0;p2(e1 xA2 )]
2
2 : (72)
Applying, then, Transformation (65) we obtain:
P (z2; 2) = e
min[0;p2(e1 (z2 2))] 2
2 : (73)
The nal condition is altered also by Transformation (67), since it is expressed in T and we
know that:
t = T ,  = 0 , (74)
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therefore it should be expressed at the beginning of the period under consideration; since
we are analyzing separately the period [1; 2], as it would be a unique one  = 0 is actually
translatable in  = 1:Equation (73) becomes:
P (z1; 1) = e
min[0;p2(e1 z1+)] 2
2 (75)
Combining Equation (71) with the initial condition (75) we arrive at the solution:
~u(z ; ) =
1
2
p

h
1 + erf(B0 (z ; )) + e
D0(z ;)(1  erf(A0 (z ; )))
i
, (76)
where:
A0 (z ; ) =
e1   z +  + p22

p

, (77)
B0 (z ; ) =
e1   z + 

p

, (78)
D0 (z ; ) =
p2(2p2 + 2(e1   z + ))
22
. (79)
Now we need to apply all the inverse transformations to express the solution in V (xAt ; t):
We rst apply to Equation (76) the Transformation (68) obtaining:
u(zt; t) =
1
2
p
2  t
[1 + erf(B00 (zt; t)) + e
D00(zt;t)(1  erf(A00 (zt; t)))]; (80)
where:
A00 (zt; t) =
e1   zt +  + p22(2  t)

p
(2  t)
; (81)
B00 (zt; t) =
e1   zt + 

p
(2  t)
, (82)
D00 (zt; t) =
p2(2p2 + 2(e1   zt + ))
22
. (83)
Then we have to apply Transformation (66) to Equation (80) which gives:
v(xAt ; t) =
1
2
p
2  t
[1 + erf(BCDM(x
A
t ; t)) + e
DCDM (x
A
t ;t)(1  erf(ACDM(xAt ; t)))] , (84)
Finally it remains to apply Transformation (64) to Equation (84) in order to get the nal
solution:38
V (xAt ; t) =
2
t
ln
24 12p2 t [1 + erf(BCDM(xAt ; t))+eDCDM (xAt ;t)
(1  erf(ACDM(xAt ; t)))]
35 (85)
 C[ln 3  ln(t+ 1)],
38Remember that we have previously removed from the maximization problem the parameter - Ct+1 ; so now
we have to add back to the value function
R 2
t
  Cx+1dx =  C[log 3  log(t+ 1)]:
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where A () ; B () and D() are specied in Equations (48), (49) and (50). At this point, in
order to obtain the optimal solution (25) we need to di¤erentiate (85) with respect to xAt :
It can be easily shown that this solution coincides with Equation (51), which gives us the
instantaneous price in every moment of the interval [1; 2] :
In order to proceed with dynamic programming we need the value function evaluated
at t = 1; from the previous discussion we know that this is a discontinuity point for V ()
which can take two di¤erent values depending on if it is evaluated at xA1 or x
A
1+. Since we
are using a dynamic programming approach and this nal condition comes directly from the
maximization over the period [1; 2] we should use V
 
xA1+; 1

:
V (xA1+; 1) =
2
1
ln
24 12 [1 + erf(BCDM(xA1+; 1))+eDCDM (xA1+;1)
(1  erf(ACDM(xA1+; 1)))]
35  Ĉ:39 (86)
Once obtained this value we need to plug it back in Equation (59) in place of the last
part of the Equation. The maximization problem can be rewritten as:
max
(ut)t2[0;1]
E0
Z 1
0
  1
2t
u2tdt+min

0; p1(e0   xA1 )

+ V
 
xA1+; 1

, (87)
where the new terminal condition is:
P (xA1 ; 1) = min

0; p1(e0   xA1 )

+ V
 
xA1+; 1

. (88)
Notice that this nal condition contains both xA1 and x
A
1+: the compliance condition is
expressed in terms of xA1 , while the maximum value V () depends on xA1+; we should not
forget that xA1+ is a function of x
A
1 :
Given the fact that from Equation (59) nothing has changed, except for the nal condi-
tion, also the PDE will remain the same as in Equation (60). Following exactly the same
passages as before we only have to recompute the di¤erent nal condition under all the
transformations. After Transformation (63) we will obtain:
P (xA1 ; 1) = e
min[0;p1(e0 xA1 )]
1
2
24 12 [1 + erf(BCDM(xA1+; 1))]+eDCDM (xA1+;1)
(1  erf(ACDM(xA1+; 1)))]
35 e Ĉ 12 : (89)
After Transormation (65) it will read as:40
P (z1; 1) = e
min[0;p1(e0 z1+)] 1
2
24 12 [1 + erf(BCDM(z1+   ; 1))+eDCDM (z1+ ;1)
(1  erf(ACDM(z1+   ; 1)))]
35 e Ĉ 12 : (90)
40Since we want to mantain the distinction between xA1 and x
A
1+ we will use z1 for the transformed x
A
1
and z1+ for the transformed xA1+:
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After Transformation (67), remembering the condition (74), it will become:
P (z0; 0) = e
min[0;p1(e0 z0)] 1
2
24 12 [1 + erf(BCDM(z0+; 0))+eDCDM (z0+;0)
(1  erf(ACDM(z0+; 0)))]
35 e Ĉ 12 : (91)
We are now ready to compute the solution of the Heat Equation, neverthless this time
we are unable to obtain it explicitly; in particular we arrive at:
~u(z ; ) =
e Ĉ
1
2
2
p

(
Z e0
 1
8<:e (z z0)222
24 12 [1 + erf(B(z0+; 0))+eDCDM (z0+;0)
(1  erf(A(z0+; 0)))]
359=; dz0 + (92)
Z +1
e0
8<:e (z z0)222 ep1(e0 z0) 12
24 12 [1 + erf(BCDM(z0+; 0))+eDCDM (z0+;0)
(1  erf(ACDM(z0+; 0)))]
359=; dz0) .
In order to obtain a solution for V (xAt ; t); we need to apply all the inverse transormations;
we start with Transformation (68),41 obtaining:
u(zt; t) =  ;CDM
 
t; zAt
 1
2
[1 + erf(BCDM(z0+; 0)) + e
DCDM (z0+;0)(1  erf(ACDM(z0+; 0)))](93)
++;CDM
 
t; zAt
 1
2
[1 + erf(BCDM(z0+; 0)) + e
DCDM (z0+;0)(1  erf(ACDM(z0+; 0)))]:
Then we apply Transformation (66), obtaining:
v(xAt ; t) =  ;CDM
 
t; xAt

F1;CDM + +;CDM
 
t; xAt

F1;CDM : (94)
Finally, applying Transformation (64) we arrive at the solution42:
V (xAt ; t) =
2
t
ln[ ;CDM
 
t; xAt

F1;CDM ++;CDM
 
t; xAt

F1;CDM ] C[ln 2  ln(t+1)]: (95)
At this point, in order to obtain the optimal solution (25) we need to di¤erentiate (95)
with respect to xt: It can be easily shown that this solution coincides with Equation (58),
which gives us the instantaneous price in every moment of the interval [0; 1] :
41Remeber that this Transformation applied on the nal condition in T gave us the condition expressed
in (z0; 0); now we should bring them back into (zT ; T ), which in this case is equivalent to say (z1; 1) :
42Remember that we had previously removed from the maximization problem the parameter - Ct+1 ; so now
we have to add back to the value function
R 1
t
  Cx+1dx =  C[log 2  log(t+ 1)]
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